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Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident 
Records
Alice Guerra and Tobias M. Hlobil
ABSTRACT
The standard 1-period, unilateral care accident model assumes identical injurers and perfect 
information of an individual’s risk type. However, these assumptions are unlikely to hold in 
real- world accident scenarios. This paper considers a 2-period, unilateral care accident model 
in which injurers differ by probabilities of accident (their risk types) and have incomplete in-
formation about their risk types. We find that courts should optimally examine an individual‘s 
accident history to accurately infer the risk type and adjust the due level of care accordingly. 
We show that tailoring due levels of care in the second period affects the definition of the due 
level of care in the first period. When judges have access to accident records but the risk type 
is hidden, they should relax the due level of care for first-time offenders to generate more in-
formation about an individual’s risk type, which helps to establish more efficient differentiated 
standards in the subsequent period.
1. INTRODUCTION
The standard unilateral care accident model is generally a 1-period model 
in which potential injurers are identical and have complete information 
about their probabilities of accident (their risk types). In this traditional 
framework, the optimal due level of care—which is set to minimize the 
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social cost of accidents—is invariant over time and uniform across all po-
tential injurers (see, for example, Shavell 1980, 1987). Accident records 
are neither available nor needed. However, these assumptions are very 
unlikely to hold for most real-world accidents for a number of reasons. 
First, accidents can repetitively occur over time, and accident records 
are usually available to courts and public authorities. Second, potential 
injurers normally differ in their probabilities of accident (for example, 
individuals are not equally good at driving). Third, individuals and so-
cial planners generally have incomplete information about their own risk 
types (see, for example, Bajtelsmit and Thistle 2008, 2009). Indeed, not 
all variations in accident rates can be explained by observed factors, and 
information about each individual’s probability of accident inevitably re-
mains hidden.
This paper analyzes the optimal due levels of care in a more realistic 
2-period, unilateral care accident scenario. We introduce three extensions 
to the standard tort model (see, for example, Shavell 1980, 1987). First, 
we move from the traditional 1-period framework to a 2-period model 
in which accident records become available after the first period. This al-
lows us to consider first-time and repeat offenders, with judges evaluating 
the costs and benefits for different actors of consistently meeting the due 
level of care over time.
Second, the probability of accident is not the same for all individuals. 
We consider two types of potential injurers, namely, high-risk and low-
risk types. For any given level of precaution, the two risk types differ in 
the probability of an accident: as intuition suggests, high-risk types are 
more likely to incur accidents than low-risk types. Low-risk types can be 
interpreted as more talented or more experienced and high-risk types as 
less talented or less experienced. For example, for a given level of care, 
experienced or more talented surgeons are less likely to cause harm with 
a diagnosis or surgery than inexperienced or less talented surgeons. Simi-
larly, experienced drivers such as taxi drivers are less likely to be involved 
in accidents compared with inexperienced private drivers.
The third extension represents the key analytical feature of our analy-
sis: information about an individual’s risk type is hidden not only to the 
social planner but also to each potential injurer. Only the proportions of 
each risk type in the population are known.1 This setup can be interpreted 
under the lens of behavioral biases about risk perception. As several ex-
1. Bajtelsmit and Thistle (2008, 2009) use a similar framework to analyze the demand 
for liability insurance.
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perimental and psychological research studies reveal, individuals gener-
ally ignore and routinely misjudge their own accident risks, for example, 
because of optimistic or pessimistic dispositions, lack of knowledge, or an 
inability to accurately process available information (for example, Viscusi 
and Zeckhauser 2004; Viscusi and Evans 2006).
By relying on this theoretical framework, we bring to light two novel 
considerations of the optimal definition of due levels of care. First, we 
find that, in the presence of heterogeneous risk and imperfect informa-
tion, negligence standards should be optimally tailored to accident re-
cords. Courts should examine the defendant’s history of accidents to 
more accurately infer the type of risk that he or she poses and adjust his 
or her due level of care accordingly, as insurance companies do to set 
individualized premiums. The rationale for tailoring due levels of care 
is indeed quite similar to the practice in the insurance industry of setting 
individualized premiums or assigning demerit points on the basis of past 
reported behavior (see, for example, Bourgeon and Picard 2007; Friehe 
2008; Dionne, Michaud, and Pinquet 2013).2
More interestingly, we show that the possibility of tailoring due lev-
els of care in the second period affects the definition of the due level of 
care in the first period. This is the less obvious and more novel insight, 
which we label the first-period effect: the efficiency of setting one-size-fits-
all due levels of care at a level lower than the literature has suggested. The 
current literature commonly argues that when information about hetero-
geneous risk is hidden, the optimal due level of care should be at an av-
eraged, static level. However, from an intertemporal perspective, courts 
might deviate from this static optimization. Our analysis reveals that by 
relaxing the due level of care for first-time offenders, more accidents oc-
cur in the first period, but more information is subsequently gathered 
about the differential propensities to create accident risks. This added in-
formation later helps to establish more efficient differentiated standards. 
Counter to intuition, inducing more accidents in the first period may be 
socially valuable since it can help to minimize the social costs associated 
with accidents across time. The logic is intuitive: accidents today can re-
duce the total social cost tomorrow. Essentially, the cost of an accident 
is the price of screening which potential injurers are more likely to be the 
higher- and lower-risk types.
By considering heterogeneous injurers, this paper is linked to stud-
2. Closely related to our paper are Crocker and Doherty (2000) and Bajtelsmit and 
Thistle (2008, 2009), which focus on the incentives to purchase liability insurance.
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ies analyzing the implications of individual heterogeneities in negligence 
law.3 This literature argues that when the social planner cannot observe 
individual heterogeneities, the optimal solution is to set an averaged, 
static due level of care (for example, Ganuza and Gomez 2005; Miceli 
2006; Bajtelsmit and Thistle 2009; Endres and Friehe 2014; Korsmo 
2016).4 The relevance and timely nature of the present paper is under-
scored by the fact that the discussion on personalizing due levels of care 
in the legal literature has been revived by Ben-Shahar and Porat (2016), 
in which past information about similar behavior is discussed as a proxy 
for potential injurers’ abilities and tendencies with respect to risk creation 
and precaution taking.5 This suggests that a driver’s traffic violation or an 
instance of medical malpractice by a physician can be used by the court in 
personalizing the standard of care.
The idea of tailoring due levels of care to accident records bears some 
formal similarities to the practice in criminal law of punishing repeat of-
fenders more severely than first-time offenders.6 Instead of applying es-
calating penalties, tort law generally imposes punitive damages or civil 
monetary penalties on repeat tortfeasors (see, for example, Polinsky and 
Shavell 1998a; Rhee 2012). A major factor in imposing punitive damages 
is whether harmful conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated 
incident, as the Supreme Court found in State Farm Mutual Automobile 
3. The heterogeneities between individuals considered in the literature relate to the 
costs of taking care and the wealth of potential injurers (Arlen 1992; Miceli and Segerson 
1995), the ability to take and cost of taking care (Ganuza and Gomez 2005), and the dif-
ference in relative gain from potentially harmful activities (Emons 1990a, 1990b; Emons 
and Sobel 1991). See also the principle of accident proneness (James and Dickinson 
1950).
4. The previous literature has recognized the inefficiency of applying the reasonable- 
person standard in the presence of heterogeneous parties, although it has defended its 
application when parties’ heterogeneities are costly to assess (Diamond 1974; Landes and 
Posner 1987; Shavell 1987).
5. Ben-Shahar and Porat (2016) distinguish between similar past behaviors such as 
several violations in similar circumstances and different past behaviors. Intuitively, it is 
easier to process information about the defendant’s risk-creation and precaution-taking 
tendencies from similar past behaviors.
6. This is a common practice in many countries, not only for crimes such as theft and 
murder but also for criminal violations of environmental and labor regulations (see, for 
example, Polinsky and Shavell 1998a; Chu, Hu, and Huang 2000; Dana 2001). Notwith-
standing this common practice, answers to the question of how repeat offenders should 
be punished are mixed. Under some circumstances, enhancing the efficiency of deterrence 
may require more severe punishment for repeat offenders, the use of prior convictions 
to set individualized sanctions, or both (see, for example, Dana 2001; Shepherd 2002; 
Emons 2003, 2007).
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Insurance Company v. Campbell (123 S. Ct. 1513, 1521 [2003]).7 Tailor-
ing punitive damages to the defendant’s recurring behavior is explicitly 
mentioned in several state laws, such as repeat violations of consumer 
protection laws (D.C. Code Ann., sec. 28-3813 [1981]), unlawful trade 
practices (Idaho Code, sec. 48-608), abusive recruitment practices (Iowa 
Code, sec. 91E.4), and profiteering in drug prescriptions (Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann., title 22, sec. 2697). However, unlike repeat offenders in crimi-
nal law, repeat offenders in civil law have received little attention in the 
standard tort model. Exceptions include Levmore (1990) and Polinsky 
and Shavell (1998a), which analyze whether sanctions should depend on 
prior offenses. We contribute to this literature by showing that the cur-
rent system of imposing punitive damages or greater sanctions on repeat 
offenders is less efficient at minimizing social costs than our proposal of 
tailoring negligence standards to accident records.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 character-
izes the socially optimal due levels of care and analyzes whether tailor-
ing due levels of care to accident records outperforms awarding punitive 
damages to repeat offenders. Section 3 discusses the practical relevance 
of the results, including a numerical example that provides the basic intu-
itions for the general findings. Section 4 concludes and suggests possible 
directions for future research. Appendix A presents the theoretical model, 
and Appendix B sketches the proofs of the main results.
2. TAILORING NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS
In this section, we analyze whether and how due levels of care should be 
tailored to past accidents.8 We consider a 2-period, unilateral care ac-
cident model in which potential injurers differ in their probabilities of 
accident (their risk types). For comparative reasons, we discuss the so-
cially optimal due levels of care in three cases: when information about 
an individual’s risk type is not hidden and accident records are available; 
when information about an individual’s risk type is hidden to potential 
injurers and the social planner and accident records are available, which 
is the main case of interest in this paper; and when information about an 
individual’s risk type is hidden to potential injurers and the social planner 
7. See also Dobbs (1993, sec. 3.11[2]), which stresses that “[r]epeated misconduct or 
a policy of misconduct . . . is often an element in punitive damages cases.”
8. As is common in the literature, we assume due levels of care to be set at the socially 
optimal levels. For an analytical description of the model, see Appendix A.
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but accident records are not available. The first and third cases represent 
the two benchmark cases of perfect and imperfect information already 
studied in the literature in 1-period models. Our interest is in comparing 
them with the novel second case.
When information about an individual’s risk type is not hidden and 
accident records are available, the first-best solution is implemented by 
tailoring due levels of care to each potential injurer’s risk type—and only 
to the risk type—in each period. In this benchmark case of perfect in-
formation, no information about past accidents is required to reach the 
global minimum of the total social cost function. At the other extreme, 
when information about an individual’s risk type is hidden and accident 
records are not available, conventional results in the literature of tort law 
and economics propose an averaged due level of care as the second-best 
solution (for example, Ganuza and Gomez 2005).
Instead, our analysis shows that when information about an individu-
al’s risk type is hidden but accident records are available, the second-best 
solution is implemented by tailoring due levels of care to incidents of past 
accidents, whereas the uniform, averaged due level of care characterizes 
the third-best solution. The intuition is clear: records of past accidents 
convey crucial information about an individual’s risk type and help to 
define more efficient due levels of care. In particular, when the first-best 
solution is not achievable, the socially efficient standard of due care in the 
second period should be higher (lower) for potential injurers who were 
(were not) involved in an accident in the first period than when informa-
tion about past accidents is hidden. This result is summarized in proposi-
tion 1.
Proposition 1: Tailoring Negligence Standards to Accident Re-
cords. In the second period, when information about an individual’s 
risk type is hidden but accident records are available, the second-best 
solution is implemented by tailoring due levels of care to incidents of past 
accidents. The second-best due levels of care are higher for repeat offend-
ers than for first-time offenders.
As intuition would suggest, the rationale for proposition 1 is that the 
group of potential injurers who had an accident in the first period have a 
higher marginal probability of being involved in another accident in the 
second period. For this reason, it is socially efficient that the due level of 
care in the second period is set higher than the standard applied in the 
first period. The same reasoning holds true for those who did not have an 
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accident in the first period. On average, this group has a lower marginal 
probability of being involved in accidents in the second period. There-
fore, the due level of care for this group in the second period should be 
set lower than the standard applied in the first period.
More interestingly, the possibility of personalizing due levels of care in 
the second period influences the definition of the due level of care in the 
first period. This follows by comparing the optimal due level of care for 
the first period in two cases: when due levels of care in the second period 
are tailored to past accident experiences (second-best solution) and when 
a uniform due level of care is set over time (third-best solution). The re-
sult is summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2: Information-Forcing Negligence Standard. In the first 
period, when information about an individual’s risk type is hidden but 
accident records are available, the second-best due level of care should be 
optimally set lower than the averaged, static due level of care. This allows 
for gathering more information about individuals’ risk types and estab-
lishing more efficient differentiated standards in the second period.
Proposition 2 highlights the simple and important first-period effect: 
by deviating downward from the static, one-size-fits-all due level of care 
suggested in the previous literature, more accidents occur and more in-
formation is subsequently learned about the differential propensities to 
create accident risks. This added information later helps to establish more 
efficient differentiated standards, thus reducing social costs in the second 
period.9
Since the tort system already treats first-time and repeat offenders dif-
ferently through punitive damages or escalated administrative sanctions 
(for example, suspension or revocation of a driver’s license), one might 
ask whether and when—that is, under which conditions—tailoring negli-
gence standards outperforms awarding punitive damages or greater civil 
monetary sanctions for repeat offenders.10 Consider the current legal sys-
tem in which the due level of care is averaged and time invariant and civil 
9. This result has some similarities with prior models showing that deviations from 
static optimality are justified because of the information-forcing effect that these devia-
tions have. For example, information-forcing defaults in contract law compel individuals 
to state terms in their contracts expressively. Among others, see Porat and Strahilevitz 
(2013), which explores the role of Big Data in the personalization of default rules. We 
thank the reviewer for this insight.
10. Our analytical argument relies solely on incentives for precaution without refer-
ring to administrative cost savings.
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penalties or punitive damages depend on whether the defendant has a 
record of prior offenses. By comparing the respective social costs, we find 
that tailoring negligence standards is more efficient than awarding puni-
tive damages: the information-forcing role of tailoring negligence stan-
dards is crucial in minimizing total social costs over time and across risk 
types. Lowering the first-period due level of care increases the costs of 
accidents in the first period, which yields informational benefits in sub-
sequent periods. In this case, simply treating repeat offenders disadvan-
tageously by awarding punitive damages in the second period—while 
keeping the negligence standard fixed at the average level—would neither 
yield any informational benefit nor enhance deterrence. We refer to this 
result as the desirability of tailoring negligence standards, and it is for-
mally derived in Appendix B.
3. PRACTICAL MEANING
We now discuss the practical meaning of our findings. Beyond the novel, 
theoretical contribution of this paper, a crucial question that emerges 
is when—that is, under which circumstances—courts could in practice 
deviate from optimal standards downward for the purpose of generat-
ing better information for the future. Are there contexts in which the 
information- forcing aspect of the first-period effect is sufficiently rele-
vant that judges would follow this suggestion in practice? The answer 
is a qualified yes: the first-period effect is particularly relevant in cases in 
which the population of interest is heterogeneous in risk type, whereby 
each actor’s risk type is hidden information.
Moreover, the fine-grained tweaking that we propose would be per-
ceptible in situations in which the negligence standard is not vaguely 
defined in practice but rather precisely determined by the law that was 
violated, for example, by safety statutes, regulations, or municipal ordi-
nances. Traffic violations are the most obvious examples. In these cases, 
the judge still has to evaluate whether the conduct violated the statute 
and caused the accident, although the due level of care is precisely deter-
mined: it was either violated or it was not, with no intermediate possibil-
ities. For instance, the standard of due care in a speeding case assumes 
that a reasonable person would not drive a vehicle over the speed limit. 
Our findings suggest that the decision concerning whether to squarely ad-
here to a legislative standard should lie within the discretion of the court, 
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which should be free to deviate from statutory or regulatory limits wher-
ever they appear unreasonable given the circumstances of the accident.11
As an example, let us consider speeding. Speeding—which is a per-
sistent, costly social problem—is particularly well suited to elucidate the 
practical meaning of our findings for the following reasons.12 Some driv-
ers have a much higher risk of crash or injury when driving above the 
speed limit than others. Moreover, drivers do not generally know their 
own risk of accident: some individuals can drive safely above the speed 
limit, while others are at higher risk of accident even when driving below 
the speed limit. Clearly, in this case one size does not fit all. However, 
information about an individual’s risk type is normally hidden not only 
to the social planner but also to each driver. Thus, national or municipal 
legislation generally imposes uniform and static speed limits on all  drivers.
Our paper proposes a negligence system in which low-risk and high-
risk drivers are better identified and efficiently targeted. The fact that a 
driver has a record of prior speeding-related accidents may provide infor-
mation about his or here type of risk, such as a higher-than- average pro-
pensity to cause accidents when speeding. This information- based reason 
justifies tailoring negligence standards to accident records. Moreover, it 
is possible to go one step further. Gathering information about risk types 
comes with a price, namely, a speed limit for first-time offenders that is 
higher than the static, averaged speed limit. This will increase accident 
costs in the first period but reduce the total social costs over time.
To provide clearer explanations of our results, we present the follow-
ing numerical example. We use a unilateral care scenario in which the 
population of potential injurers comprises high-risk and low-risk driv-
ers. Each driver lives for 2 periods, and in each period each driver may 
cause an accident that results in harm d = 100. Suppose that there are 33 
low-risk drivers for every seven high-risk drivers in this population. The 
proportion of low-risk drivers, λL, is equal to .825, and the proportion of 
high-risk drivers, λH, is equal to .175.
11. In this respect, our paper contributes to the extensive debate on judicial discretion 
in claims involving negligence per se. See, among others, the discussion in Yowell (1997).
12. Speeding is one of the most important factors in the causation and severity of 
many accidents (see, for example, Aarts and van Schagen 2006; Fitzpatrick, Rakasi, and 
Knodler 2017). For instance, in 2016 speed-related fatal accidents accounted for 27 per-
cent of all traffic fatalities in the United States. For extensive records on speeding-related 
fatalities, see the reports published by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (for example, National Center for Statistics and Analysis 2018).
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Let us describe the traditional, static scenario. In each period, each 
potential injurer can take different levels of care x at a unit cost of 1 to 
reduce the probability of an accident. In our practical example, the level 
of care is related to the rate of speed. A speed of 65 miles per hour (mph) 
corresponds to a level of care x equal to 0, and a speed of 15 mph cor-
responds to a level of care x equal to 10. Let pL(x) and pH(x) denote the 
probability of accident of a low- and a high-risk type, respectively. The 
probability of an accident decreases as levels of care increase, that is, as 
speed decreases.13 The relationship among the level of care, the speed, the 
probability of accident, and social costs is presented in Table 1.
Ideally, under perfect information about an individual’s risk type, the 
first-best solution would be to tailor the speed limit to each risk type, that 
is, 40 mph for a low-risk driver L**( 5)x =  and 25 mph for a high-risk 
driver H**( 8).x =  In each period, the social cost of accidents would then 
be equal to 5.50 for low-risk drivers and 9.63 for high-risk drivers (see 
Table 1). The total social cost would then be equal to 6.22 (=.825 × 5.50 
+ .175 × 9.63) per period and thus 12.44 over 2 periods.
However, information about an individual’s risk type is normally hid-
den. It is a standard result in the economic analysis of accidents and li-
ability that a due level of care invariant over time and averaged across 
individuals induces the second-best level of precaution. This leads to an 
averaged speed limit equal to 35 mph **( 6).x =  The social cost of ac-
cidents would then be 7.05 per period and thus 14.107 over 2 periods, 
which is obviously higher than the social costs under perfect tailoring.
For the sake of clarity, consider two drivers: driver A is a low-risk 
type, and driver B is a high-risk type. In case of perfect information, the 
social planner would optimally set personalized speed limits at 40 mph 
for driver A and 25 mph for driver B. However, information about their 
risk types is hidden, and the social planner sets a speed limit averaged 
at 35 mph. Suppose that the two drivers are involved in separate, inde-
pendent, but identical accidents: they each hit a legally parked vehicle, 
and the owner of the vehicle sues. Driver A was driving at 40 mph, and 
driver B was driving at 30 mph. Given the speed limit of 35 mph, driver 
A is deemed negligent, whereas driver B is considered nonnegligent. It is 
clear that the uniform speed limit targets the low-risk driver—who was 
driving safely at his or her optimal speed level—rather than the high-risk 
driver—who was instead driving unsafely above his or her optimal speed 
13. The functional form of the probability function used in this example is pL(x) = 
2/(1 + e1.2x) for low-risk types and pH(x) = 2/(1 + e.6x) for high-risk types. Other func-
tional forms and parameters can be used for the probability functions (for example, logis-
tic functions), subject to the assumptions described in Appendix A.
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level. The result is that low-risk drivers will be overdeterred and more 
frequently sanctioned, while high-risk drivers will be underdeterred and 
more likely to repeat the same offenses over time. This overall implies 
higher social costs.
We now expand this setting so that judges may use accident records 
to tailor due levels of care in the second period. Suppose that the social 
planner keeps the averaged speed limit in the first period, that is, 35 mph. 
In the second period, there are two groups of potential injurers: those who 
had an accident in the first period and those who did not. It is possible 
to update the probabilities of high or low risks on the basis of prior acci-
dents. The probability of being a high-risk type given that an accident oc-
curred in the first period is equal to .883 (=.175 × .0532/(.175 × .0532 + 
.825 × .0015)), whereas the probability of being a low-risk type given that 
an accident occurred in the first period is equal to .117 (=.825 × .0015/
(.175 × .0532 + .825 × .0015)). Similarly, the probabilities of being a 
high-risk or a low-risk type given that an accident did not occur in the first 
period are equal to .167 and .833, respectively.
It is possible to show that in the second period the optimal speed limit 
should be 25 mph for repeat offenders (due level of care equal to 8) and 
40 mph for first-time offenders (due level of care equal to 5).14 Therefore, 
14. Formally, let 
12|A
**x  and 
12|NA
**x  denote the optimal due levels of care for the 
group that incurred an accident in the first period and the group that did not, respec-
tively. The optimal due levels of care are derived from the following optimization 
problems: Î + +
1 1 1 12|A L 2|A H 2|A 2|A
** arg min[.117 . 1( ) (883 00)]x p x p x x  and, similarly, Î + +
1 1 1 12| A L 2|NA H 2|NA 2|NA
( ) ( )] .** arg min[.833 .167 100Nx p x p x x
Î + +
1 1 1 12| A L 2|NA H 2|NA 2|NA
( ) ( )] .** arg min[.833 .167 100Nx p x p x x
Table 1. Accidents and Social Costs
Speed
(mph)
Care
(x)
Probability of Accident Social Costs
pH(x) pL(x) H**x L**x **x
65 0 1 1 100 100 100
60 1 .708 .462 71.868 47.295 51.595
55 2 .462 .166 48.295 18.634 23.825
50 3 .283 .053 31.370 8.319 12.353
45 4 .166 .016 20.634 5.632 8.257
40 5 .094 .004 14.485 5.494 7.067
35 6 .053 .001 11.319 6.149 7.053
30 7 .029 .000 9.954 7.044 7.554
25 8 .016 .000 9.632 8.013 8.296
20 9 .008 .000 9.899 9.004 9.160
15 10 .004 .000 10.494 10.001 10.087
Note. The values for social costs are Î +H Hargmin ( )**x p x d x, Î +L Largmin ( )**x p x d x, 
and H H L Largmin[ ( ) ( )]**x p x p x d xl lÎ + + .
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the social costs for the drivers who had an accident in the first period are 
equal to 9.44 (=.883 × 9.63 + .117 × 8.01). Similarly, the social costs 
for the drivers who did not have an accident in the first period are equal 
to 7.00 (=.167 × 14.49 + .833 × 5.50). By pooling the two groups, in 
the second period the total social costs are thus equal to 7.026.15 The so-
cial costs in the first period are equal to 7.053, and thus the overall social 
costs over the 2 periods are 14.079.
We now show that total social costs can be further reduced by rais-
ing the first-period speed limit from 35 mph to 40 mph (or, equivalently, 
by reducing the first-period due level of care from 6 to 5). The accident 
costs in the first period increase, which leads social costs to increase from 
7.053 to 7.067. However, the accident costs in the second period de-
crease, especially those related to high-risk types, which leads social costs 
to decrease from 7.026 to 6.997. Overall, total social costs decrease from 
14.079 to 14.064. 
The results from the practical example are summarized in Table 2. In 
Appendix B, we demonstrate that these findings hold general validity.
Lowering the due level of care in the first period amplifies the effect of 
tailoring negligence standards to accident records in the second period. 
Roughly speaking, we see that a slight reduction in the first-period due 
level of care yields an increase in the proportion of high-risk drivers in the 
group of injurers who had an accident in the first period and a decrease 
in the proportion of high-risk drivers in the group of injurers who did not 
have an accident in the first period. Essentially, inducing accidents in the 
first period better signals individuals’ risk types and amplifies the benefits 
of tailoring negligence standards in the next period.
For the sake of clarity, let us consider again the example of drivers A 
and B, in which driver A was driving at 40 mph and driver B was driv-
15. That is, (.0532 × .175 + .0015 × .825) × 9.44 + [(1 − .0532) × .175 + (1 − 
.0015) × .825] × 7.00 = 7.026.
Table 2. Optimal Speed Limits
Period 2
Period 1
First-Time 
Offender
Repeat 
Offender
Social 
Costs
Policy 1 35 35 35 14.107
Policy 2 35 40 25 14.079
Policy 3 40 40 25 14.064
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ing at 30 mph when their accidents occurred. Suppose that the judge is 
more tolerant of first-time offenses and considers an injurer to be negli-
gent if his or her speed did not exceed 40 mph (x = 5) when the accident 
occurred. In this case, neither driver A nor driver B will be found negli-
gent in the first period. This slight upward deviation of the speed limit 
approaches the optimal speed limit of driver A (that is, 40 mph), while it 
departs from the optimal speed limit of driver B (that is, 25 mph). Conse-
quently, if an accident occurs in the next period, the judge can infer that 
the individual is more likely a high-risk type than a low-risk type and can 
efficiently require a higher due level of care, for example, a speed limit 
equal to 30 mph or less. Overall, compared with other policies, our pro-
posal reduces the total social costs over time and approximates the first-
best solution.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper adds important aspects of reality to the conventional unilat-
eral care accident model, namely, that accidents may repetitively occur 
over time, potential injurers differ in their probabilities of accident, and 
neither the individual nor the social planner can perfectly observe an in-
dividual’s risk types. In this kind of context, we find that the accident his-
tory of an injurer should be used by courts to more accurately infer his or 
her risk type and adjust his or her due level of care accordingly over time. 
The less obvious and more novel insight is what we label the first-period 
effect: the efficiency of setting one-size-fits-all due levels of care at a level 
lower than prior literature has suggested.
Under current thinking, when courts have no information about het-
erogeneous risk, the optimal due level of care should be at some interme-
diate level. However, looking ahead might drive courts to deviate from 
this static optimization: by reducing the uniform, first-period due level of 
care, more accidents occur, and more information is subsequently gath-
ered about individuals’ risk types.  This added information helps to estab-
lish more efficient differentiated negligence standards.
Despite appearing counterintuitive at first glance, a slight reduction 
in the first-period due level of care is likely to substantially reduce social 
costs over time since it allows policy makers to better focus their safety 
efforts on the highest-risk proportion of the population. Our proposed 
policy helps judges to efficiently screen potential injurers over time and 
adjust the due level of care accordingly, thus better approaching the first-
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best solution. Although we do not formally analyze a model with 3 or 
more periods, we believe that the optimal definition of due levels of care 
would have two properties: in each period, optimal due levels of care are 
nondecreasing in the number of prior violations, and the due level of care 
for individuals with the highest possible number of prior violations is 
maximal. We further believe that by considering an extended time frame, 
the first-period effect would be more salient and relevant.
Our theoretical contribution finds its practical relevance within the 
realm of judicial discretion in adhering to legislative standards of care, 
for example, speeding and standards of behavior for professional drivers. 
Cases in which statutory standards are so unreasonable that the court 
should optimally deviate from them might be relatively frequent, espe-
cially whenever the population of interest is heterogeneous. For example, 
driving 40 mph where the legal limit is 35 mph should not be considered 
inherently wrong or unreasonable. Moreover, within the unlimited realm 
of judicial discretion, our findings suggest the reason why and the circum-
stances under which judges should optimally deviate from strict adop-
tion of legislative standards. It is important to note that accident records 
are informative and useful when the population of potential injurers is 
substantially heterogeneous in risk type. In this case, tailoring negligence 
standards to accident records is practically relevant and socially valuable.
The ability of judges and policy makers to efficiently tailor negligence 
standards to accident records might encounter practical difficulties given 
the possibly high administrative costs and frequent legal errors. The ap-
plication of a vaguer uniform standard of care for heterogeneous injur-
ers is generally defended when producing information on individuals’ 
subjective characteristics such as costs of private care is costly and er-
ror prone (see, for example, Ganuza and Gomez 2005; Emons 2007). 
Nonetheless, these problems with error are indeed a point of strength in 
tailoring negligence standards to accident records, which is expected to 
facilitate—rather than complicate—judicial discretion in assessing negli-
gence. As intuition suggests, it is relatively costless to access information 
about individuals’ accident histories since most accident records are gen-
erally available to public authorities (Ben-Shahar and Porat 2016). More-
over, the occurrence of similar accidents involving the same individual is 
a reliable, uncontroversial, and objective piece of information. For these 
reasons, tailoring standards to individuals’ objective accident records is 
not expected to be excessively costly and error prone, at least if compared 
with individuals’ other subjective characteristics that are more difficult 
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for judges to correctly observe and assess, such as mental disability and 
costs of private care. In general, tailoring negligence standards to accident 
records is justified whenever the benefits of reducing social costs over 
time outweigh the costs of gathering and processing information about 
risk types.
Whether our theoretical proposal to tailor negligence standards to ac-
cident records would reduce the social costs of accidents in real-life cases 
is ultimately an empirical question. Accordingly, future research can be 
developed in this direction. For example, field experiments may be de-
signed to test the efficiency of our proposal in reducing speeding vio-
lations over time. If a slight increase in the first-period speed limit and 
speed limits tailored to prior speeding-related accidents yield lower social 
costs over time than applying a uniform and static speed limit, then the 
first-period effect revealed in our analysis is not only theoretically but 
also practically relevant.
Another interesting direction for future studies would be to analyze 
situations in which courts do not observe individuals’ risk types while po-
tential injurers do. In such cases, opportunistic behavior might arise, and 
the admissibility of past records at trial might not be warranted. Another 
possible extension is to model a high-risk type as implying a higher cost 
of care, as in Ganuza and Gomez (2005), instead of a higher probability 
of accident. In these cases, results can be different, especially in settings 
with asymmetric information. We would predict that, in a 2-period set-
ting such as in this paper, where due care standards may depend on acci-
dent history, the classical ratchet effect would arise (Freixas, Guesnerie, 
and Tirole 1985; Laffont and Tirole 1990): low-cost injurers would 
mimic high-cost ones by being involved in accidents, which would allow 
them to be seen as high-cost injurers deserving a more lenient standard.
An important implication of our results is related to activity levels. By 
considering that activity levels are generally assumed to be inversely re-
lated to due levels of care (Shavell 1980, 1987), our findings suggest that 
it would be reasonable to discourage high-risk individuals from engaging 
in the relevant risky activity, at least for a certain period of time. This can 
explain the common practice of suspending licenses of drivers who are 
persistent violators. Similarly, truck drivers who have been repeatedly in-
volved in accidents are generally moved to departments with low poten-
tials for accidents, and young, less-experienced surgeons are not allowed 
to perform high-risk surgeries (at least without proper supervision).
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It is worth noting that due levels of care tailored to accident records 
might produce not only positive but also potentially negative incentive 
effects. Given that injuries in the first period will raise due levels of care 
in the second period, individuals may refrain from engaging in risky yet 
beneficial activities, being afraid that their past will be used against them. 
Our framework can be fruitfully adapted to investigate such potential 
negative effects.
APPENDIX A: THE MODEL
A1. Setting the Stage
We consider a 2-period, unilateral care accident model with heterogeneous risk 
types and imperfect information.16 Each potential injurer in the society lives 2 pe-
riods, and the discount rate is 0 (no time preferences). We consider the case of 
risk-neutral agents and symmetric information; that is, the information available 
to each potential injurer and social planner is the same.17 An accident may occur 
in both or either of the periods of the model. In case of an accident, each victim 
suffers harm d > 0. We assume perfect compensation in cases in which the injurer 
is found liable. Potential injurers and victims are strangers to each other or at least 
do not have the possibility of bargaining.
A2. Notation and Assumptions
Let us now define the terms and articulate the assumptions of the model. Let r ∈ {L, 
H} denote an individual’s risk type, either low risk (L) or high risk (H). Potential in-
jurers and the social planner do not observe individuals’ risk types. However, they 
know the proportion of low-risk and high-risk types in the population. Let λL and 
λH be the proportions of low-risk and high-risk types, respectively, where λL, λH > 0, 
and λL + λH = 1 (for a similar framework, see, among others, Rothschild and Sti-
glitz 1992; Hoy 1982; Crocker and Doherty 2000; Bajtelsmit and Thistle 2008, 
2009).
Let A1 (NA1) denote the event that an accident has occurred (has not occurred) 
in the first period. Let t ∈ {1, 2 | A1, 2 | NA1} denote the following three states, re-
spectively: first period, second period given that an accident occurred in the first 
period, and second period given that an accident did not occur in the first period. 
16. The analysis is confined to a 2-period model to stylize the intertemporal alloca-
tion problem in the simplest way. Similar 2-period analyses have been used in economic 
models of repeat offenders (see, for example, Polinsky and Rubinfeld 1991; Chu, Hu, and 
Huang 2000; Endres and Bertram 2006).
17. We discuss the implications of this assumption in Section 4.
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In each period, each potential injurer can invest in precautions +Î 0tx  at a unit 
cost of 1 to reduce the probability of an accident.
Let pL(xt) (pH(xt)) be the probability of an accident when a low-risk type 
(high-risk type) spends xt on care. The probability of an accident is a strictly de-
creasing, strictly convex function of expenditure on care. Low-risk types have a 
lower accident probability for any expenditure on care. Formally, < < < "L H( ) ( ) .0 1,t t tp x p x x 
< < < "L H( ) ( ) .0 1,t t tp x p x x 18 Following Bajtelsmit and Thistle (2008, 2009), we assume that 
L H( )0 ,) (t t t ;p x p x x¢> > "¢  that is, an additional investment in care by a low-risk 
type is less productive in reducing the probability of accident than an equivalent 
investment in care by a high-risk type (for an extensive discussion of this assump-
tion, see Bajtelsmit and Thistle 2008).
A3. Period 1
The probabilities that a potential injurer is involved in an accident or not are re-
spectively given as follows:19
 l l= +1 L L 1 H H 1(A1) (A ) ( ) ( )P p x p x  (A1)
and
 l l= - + -1 L L 1 H H 1(A2) (NA ) [1 ( )] [1 ( )].P p x p x  (A2)
A4. Period 2
In the second period, each potential injurer may have already been involved in 
an accident in the first period. Each potential injurer’s and the social planner’s 
prior beliefs about an individual’s risk type are updated on the basis of whether 
an accident happened in the first period. Let l
1|Ar
 (l
1|NAr
) denote the probabilities 
of belonging to a certain risk type r ∈ {L, H} given that an accident happened (did 
not happen) in the first period. Using Bayes’s rule, l
1|Ar
 and l
1|NAr
 are respectively 
given as follows:
 l l=
1|A 1 1
(A3) ( )/ (A )r r rp x P  (A3)
and
 l l= -
1|NA 1 1
(A4) [1 ( )]/ (NA )r r rp x P  (A4)
for each r ∈ {L, H}.
18. This framework is standard in the literature on insurance economics. See, among 
others, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1992), Dahlby (1981), Hoy (1982), Crocker and Doherty 
(2000), and Bajtelsmit and Thistle (2008, 2009).
19. In particular, P(A1) in equation (A1) refers to the probability with which a ran-
domly selected individual may be one who has had an accident, given that everyone in 
society chooses care level x1. Therefore, it also can be interpreted as the measure of indi-
viduals who have accidents in period 1. This interpretation also holds for the other simi-
lar specification in the model.
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In the second period, each potential injurer can belong to one of two catego-
ries: those who incurred an accident in the first period and those who did not. In 
each category, each potential injurer can be either a high-risk or a low-risk type.
Let 
12|A
x  (
12|NA
x ) denote the potential injurer’s expenditure on care in the sec-
ond period given that an accident occurred (did not occur) in the first period. The 
probabilities that a potential injurer is involved in an accident in the second period 
given that an accident either occurred or did not occur in the first period are re-
spectively defined as follows:
 l l= +
1 1 1 12 1 L|A L 2|A H|A H 2|A
(A5) (A | A ) ( ) ( )P p x p x  (A5)
and
 l l= +
1 1 1 12 1 L|NA L 2|NA H|NA H 2|NA
(A6) (A | NA ) ( ) ( ).P p x p x  (A6)
In the following sections we use this setup to characterize the social and private 
optimization problems.
A5. Social Optimization Problem
The social optimization objective is to minimize the overall expected social cost of 
accidents S, which is the sum of the expected social cost of accidents in both peri-
ods.20 The overall expected social cost of accidents includes the cost of taking care 
and the expected damages from accidents. The social maximization problem can 
be defined as follows:21
 = + +
1 1 1 1
1 2|A 2|NA1 1
1 2|A 2|NA 1 1 2|A 1 2|NA, ,
(A7) min ( , , ) (A ) (NA ) ,
x x x
S x x x S P S P S  (A7)
where S1 denotes the social costs of accidents in the first period, and 
12|A
S  (
12|NA
S ) 
denotes the social costs of accidents in the second period given that an accident 
occurred (did not occur) in the first period. These period-specific social costs of 
accidents are respectively defined as follows:
 = +1 1 1(A8) (A ) ,S P d x  (A8)
 
1 12|A 2 1 2|A
(A9) (A | A ) ,S P d x= +  (A9)
and
 
1 12|NA 2 1 2|NA
(A10) (A | NA ) .S P d x= +  (A10)
20. We limit our attention to primary effects. Given risk neutrality, secondary effects 
(namely, issues related to risk spreading) are absent in this paper. Tertiary effects (namely, 
issues related to transaction costs) are ignored.
21. For simplicity and without loss of generality, expressions in the first period are not 
discounted. Discounting is irrelevant for our results as long as individual discount rates 
do not deviate from the social discount rate. For similar formulations, see Endres and Ber-
tram (2006) and Friehe and Langlais (2017).
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The first-order conditions for the solution of the social minimization problem 
(A7) define the due levels of care in each period, which are denoted 1 ,**x  12|A ,**x  
and 
12|NA
.**x  Analytically, 1**,x  12|A** ,x  and 12|NA**x  are respectively defined as follows:
  1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
L L 1 2|A 2|NA L 2|A L 2|NA
H H 1 2|A 2|NA H 2|A H 2|NA
( ){ [1 ( ) ( )]}
(A11)
( ){ [1 ( ) ( )]} 1,
p x x x d p x p x
p x x x d p x p x
l
l
¢- - + + -
¢+- - + + - =
 (A11)
 l l¢ ¢+ + + =
1 1L L 1 L 2|A H H 1 H 2|A
(A12) ( )[1 ( )] ( )[1 ( )] 0,p x dp x p x dp x  (A12)
and
 l l¢ ¢- + + - + =
1 1L L 1 L 2|NA H H 1 H 2|NA
(A13) [1 ( )][1 ( )] [1 ( )][1 ( )] 0.p x dp x p x dp x  (A13)
A6. Private Optimization Problem
We consider the private optimization problem under a simple negligence regime. 
The court is assumed to be able to perfectly observe the level of care adopted by 
the injurer.22 The private optimization problem is defined as follows:
 = + +
1 1 1 1
1 2|A 2|NA1 1
1 2|A 2|NA 1 1 2|A 1 2|NA, ,
(A14) min ( , , ) (A ) (NA ) ,
x x x
T x x x T P T p T  (A14)
where T1 denotes the private costs of accidents in the first period, and 
12|A
T  (
12|NA
T ) 
denotes the private costs of accidents in the second period given that an accident 
occurred (did not occur) in the first period. These period-specific private costs of 
accidents are defined as follows:
 = F +1 1 1 1(A15) (A ) ,T P d x  (A15)
 = F +
1 1 12|A 2|A 2 1 2|A
(A16) (A | A ) ,T P d x  (A16)
and
 
1 1 12|NA 2|NA 2 1 2|NA
(A17) (A | NA ) .T P d x= F +  (A17)
The first-order conditions for the solution of the private minimization problem in 
equation (A14) define the privately optimal care levels in each period, which are 
denoted 
1**,x  12|A* ,x  and 12|NA* .x
Under a simple negligence rule, parameters Φt are defined as follows:
 
0ìï ³ïïF = íïï <ïî
**given that
(A18) .
**1 given that
t t
t
t t
x x
x x
 (A18)
22. For a similar formulation of the private minimization problem given a rule of 
negligence, see Endres and Bertram (2006). For a study of the effect of legal error on the 
incentives to exercise care, see Polinsky and Shavell (1989).
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As in the traditional literature on the economics of negligence, the switch param-
eters Φt guarantee that the compensation that the potential injurer has to pay is 
equal to damages if he or she is found negligent. Comparing the expected private 
costs of the potential injurer when his or her level of care equals the due levels of 
care with a situation in which the injurer is negligent leads to the well-known re-
sult that individual compliance with the due level of care is the private optimum.23
APPENDIX B: PROOFS
B1. Proof of Proposition 1
By rearranging equations (A12) and (A13), 
12|A
**x  and 
12|NA
**x  can be expressed as 
follows:
 l
l
¢+
- =
¢+
1
1
H 1 H 2|AL
H L 1 L 2|A
**( )[1 ( )]
(B1)
**( )[1 ( )]
p x dp x
p x dp x
 (B1)
and
 
l
l
¢- +
- =
¢- +
1
1
H 1 H 2|NAL
H L 1 L 2|NA
**[1 ( )][1 ( )]
(B2) ,
**[1 ( )][1 ( )]
p x dp x
p x dp x
 (B2)
respectively. Since the left-hand side in equation (B1) is equal to the left-hand side 
in equation (B2), for the first-order conditions (B1) and (B2) to hold, the right-
hand side of equation (B1) should be equal to the right-hand side of equation (B2). 
This requires that (rearranging)
 
¢ ¢+ +- =
¢ ¢+ +-
1 1
1 1
H 2|A L 2|NAL 1 H 1
L 2|A H 2|NAH 1 L 1
[1 ( )][1 ( )]** **( )[1 ( )]
(B3) .
[1 ( )][1 ( )]** **( )[1 ( )]
dp x dp xp x p x
dp x dp xp x p x
 (B3)
Since by construction < < < "L H( ) ( ) ,0 1,  t t tp x p x x  where t ∈ {1, 2 | A1, 2 | NA1}, 
the left-hand side of equation (B3) is less than 1. Condition (B3) holds if its right-
hand side is less than 1 as well. This requires that (rearranging)
 
¢ ¢+ +
<
¢ ¢+ +
1 1
1 1
H 2|A L 2|A
H 2|NA L 2|NA
1 ( ) 1 ( )
(B4) .
1 ( ) 1 ( )
dp x dp x
dp x dp x
 (B4)
If =
1 12|A 2|NA
** ** ,x x  the left-hand side of expression (B4) becomes equal to 
the right-hand side of expression (B4); this yields a result that violates ex-
pression (B4). Since by construction p′(xt) < 0, p′′(xt) < 0, ,tx"  where t ∈ {1, 
2 | A1, 2 | NA1}, if <
1 12|A 2|NA
** ** ,x x  then { }
1 12|A 2|NA
,  L, H .** **( ) ( )r rx xp p r" Î¢>¢  By 
construction, L H .0 p( ) ( ),  t t tp x x x¢ ¢> > "  This implies that if <1 12|A 2|NA** **x x , the 
left-hand side of expression (B4) increases faster than the right-hand side of ex-
pression (B4). This yields a result that violates expression (B4). By contrast, if 
23. Proofs are available from the authors on request.
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>
1 12|A 2|NA
** **x x , then { }"¢ < ¢ Î
1 12|A 2|NA
** ** , L, H .( ) ( )r rp x p x r  Since by construction 
¢> ¢ > "L H0 ) ( ,( )t t tp x p x x , this implies that if >1 12|A 2|NA** ** ,x x  the left-hand side of 
expression (B4) decreases faster than the right-hand side of expression (B4). This 
yields a result that satisfies expression (B4). It follows that expression (B3) holds 
if >
1 12|A 2|NA
** ** .x x  Q.E.D.
B2. Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first analytically derive the third-best due level of care. When information 
about an individual’s risk type is hidden and information about accident records 
is not available (or not accessible), the social optimization problem over 2 periods 
simplifies as follows:
 U(B5) min ( ) 2[ (A) ],x S x P d x= +  (B5)
where l l= +L L H H .(A) ( ) ( )x p xP p  The solution gives the third-best, uniform, aver-
aged due level of care, which is denoted **x  and defined as follows: 
 L L H H(B6) ( ( ) ( )) 1.p x p x dl l¢ ¢- + =  (B6)
Let us compare the second-best due level of care 1**x —as defined in equation 
(A11)—and the third-best due level of care—as defined in equation (B6). It can be 
easily proved that =1** **x x  if =1 12|A 2|NA ,** **x x  which is never satisfied as proved in 
proposition 1. It follows that ¹1 .** **x x
We now prove that <1 .** **x x  The left-hand side in equation (A11) (equa-
tion [B6]) represents the marginal benefit of 1**x  ( **x ). Thus, <1** **x x  if the 
marginal benefit of 1**x  is lower than the marginal benefit of .**x  This happens 
when + > + " Î
1 1 1 12|A 2|A 2|NA 2|NA
, {L, H},( ) ( )** ** ** **r rx rxp d dx xp  which is always satis-
fied given that >
1 12|A 2| A
,** **Nx x  as shown in the proof of proposition 1. Q.E.D.
B3. Proof of the Desirability of Tailoring Negligence Standards
We first recall that tailoring due levels of care to accident records represents the 
second-best solution to the social minimization problem described in equation 
(A7), whereas averaging due levels of care represents the third-best solution. Thus, 
the social costs of accidents under tailored due levels of care are lower than under 
averaged due levels of care. Formally, 
1 12|A 2|N U1 A
( ).( , , )** ** ** **S Sx x x x<  
Let us characterize the social welfare function when punitive damages are 
awarded to repeat offenders. Let D > 0 denote punitive damages. Let the due 
levels of care be fixed to the averaged, third-best level **x  as defined in equation 
(B6). The social welfare function SD is defined as follows:
 2D ** **(B7) ( ) 2[ (A) ] (A) ,S x P d x P D= + +  (B7)
where l l= +L L H H( ) ( )**( *) *AP xp px  denotes the probability of an accident 
in each period. Since D > 0 by construction, it follows straightforwardly that 
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U D( ) ( ).** **S xSx £ 24 Thus, 1 11 2|A 2|NA U D( ) ( ).*( * ** ** *, *, ) * *S x x x x xS S< £  By the 
transitive property, 
1 11 2|A 2|NA D
( ),( , , )** ** ** **S Sx x x x<  which proves that tailoring 
negligence standards to accident records outperforms awarding punitive damages 
to repeat offenders in minimizing the social costs of accidents. Q.E.D.
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